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BLAMING THE VICTIM: A CRITIQUE OF
ATTACKS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Nadine Strossent
Randy Kennedy helped focus the discussion when he said that
on the level of principles we all agree, but we disagree about the
means for pursuing those principles. Without being disparaging, I
would say that we all agree on the level of platitude. First, we are all
in favor of individual liberty. Second, we abhor racism and poverty
as disproportionately impeding certain segments of our society from
enjoying the benefits of liberty. We disagree, though, on what remedies will effectively foster our shared goals of promoting liberty on
an equal basis.
Dr. Keyes stressed the fact that we have rights as individuals
rather than as members of groups. That is certainly true. An
equally true fact, though, is that, throughout our history, people
have been denied liberty disproportionately, and to this day are being denied liberty disproportionately, based on their membership in
particular groups. In the same vein, I completely agree with Dr.
Keyes that people should be treated not as numbers but as individuals. However, it is irresponsible for us to ignore the shockingly disproportionate extent to which the liberty of people who belong to
certain groups is violated.
Bearing in mind the useful general focus that Randy provided, I
would like to narrow the focus even further. I would like to concentrate on one particular critique that Dr. Keyes made, and that I have
heard in similar gatherings, about one particular means for addressing the ongoing crisis in this society's maldistribution of liberty on
the basis of race. I am referring to affirmative action.
In his opening remarks, Brad Reynolds talked about the "good
old days" when people were not embarrassed to talk about affirmative action. Well, I stand here before you and say I still am not embarrassed to be an advocate of affirmative action. Brad also referred
to a civil rights orthodoxy. Perhaps he and many of you see affirmative action as an outmoded part of this orthodoxy that should now
be rejected. I agree that we should not simplistically look upon one
t Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. A.B. Harvard-Radcliffe College, 1972;J.D. Harvard Law School, 1975. The author thanks the following individuals for their research assistance: Marie Costello, Elizabeth Dowell, Caroline Gargione and Catherine Siemann.
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particular remedy as a panacea. This is particularly true when the
remedies encompassed by the term "affirmative action" include a
wide panoply of measures, some of which may be more appropriate
than others. Still, I do not think it is appropriate, in a knee-jerk
fashion, to reject the entire concept of affirmative action.
Just as Brad Reynolds cautions against what he views as outmoded orthodoxies, so too, I think we also must guard against questionable new orthodoxies. A term that seems fashionable in these
circles describes another remedy that should not be viewed as a panacea: the notion of "self-help." As I listened to Dr. Keyes invoke
that seemingly magic buzzword, I was reminded of a statement that
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. made many years ago. He said it is a
cruel hoax to tell a man he should lift himself up by his bootstraps
when he has no boots. So, just as affirmative action may not be a
panacea, let us not overestimate the efficacy of alternative measures
such as self-help.
The specific critique of affirmative action on which I would like
to focus is the idea of victimization. I see it as a sort of blame-thevictim phenomenon. The argument is that the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action programs are really stigmatized by these
programs. Dr. Keyes made the argument that they are diminished,
they are disempowered, they are made to feel their inferiority. I
echo Randy Kennedy's request for evidence to demonstrate this
supposed phenomenon. It is asserted as though it were a self-understood truth, and yet I am unaware of any empirical studies that
prove this is, in fact, a psychological impact of affirmative action
programs.
Like Randy, I too looked into the empirical evidence. During
my search, I came across an interesting article in Law & Policy by a
psychologist named Rupert Barnes Nacoste, who analyzed the studies that had been done on the psychological impacts of affirmative
action.' He was responding to what he perceived as widely stated
but never empirically demonstrated conclusions that beneficiaries of
affirmative action programs experience self-doubt, that non-beneficiaries experience resentment, and consequently, that these programs cause an increase in interracial tensions. The evidence did
not support conclusions that these adverse psychological effects are
the inevitable consequences of affirmative action programs.2
Rather, the evidence strongly suggests that psychological responses
are contingent on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the information and
I Rubert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Affirmative Action, 12 LAw & POL'Y 175 (1990).
2 Id. at 190.
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the understanding that a person has about affirmative action.3 This
does not strike me as surprising.
Dr. Nacoste concluded that people's psychological reactions to
affirmative action depend in particular on two variables. 4 The first
factor is the nature of the specific program involved.5 One of the
problems with the current public discussion of this subject is that it
often does not address the many reasonable, well-conceived, and
fairly implemented programs in effect all over the county. Instead,
the term "affirmative action" is often used in a sweeping, condemnatory way, and discussions will often focus on particular ill-advised
or bizarre examples that masquerade under that term.
In this respect, the phrase "affirmative action" reminds me of
another current buzzword about which Professor Kennedy and I
have previously debated-"political correctness." That term has
taken on a pejorative meaning because too often it is associated with
a few extreme and exaggerated applications of policies that, at bottom, reflect some positive impulse toward important, laudable goals
of diversity and equality. The same thing has happened with respect
to affirmative action. The surveys to which Dr. Nacoste referred
showed that most people, if they associated affirmative action with
quotas, opposed it.6 Unfortunately, recent political discussion has
tended to equate affirmative action with quotas. In fact, in the recent political discourse about affirmative action, it is not only the
people who are allegedly benefited by these programs who are said
to be stigmatized but, even worse, the whole notion itself has become stigmatized in a way that obscures meaningful analysis and
debate.
According to Dr. Nacoste, the other variable factor that affects
the perception of affirmative action, and whether or not it has negative psychological consequences for the intended beneficiaries and
the rest of society, is how well people understand and accept the
underlying rationale. 7 In particular, he found that beneficiaries did
not feel stigmatized and non-beneficiaries felt more positive when
they understood that the target group was in fact needy and that it
was receiving just compensation for actual past harm. 8
Dr. Nacoste also found that statements by top political leaders
had a profound influence on how people perceived these programs. 9 So, not surprisingly, certain political leaders who have re3
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lentlessly associated "the Qword," "quota," with affirmative action

have played a major, unconstructive role in obscuring the debate
about the underlying merits of affirmative action. If people truly
understood the actual facts about the disproportionate denial of liberty on the basis of race throughout our history to this day, neither
the intended beneficiaries, nor the rest of society, could rationally
attach a stigma or a resentment to those programs.
This morning I re-read the brief that the American Civil Liberties Union filed in the Bakke case, 10 and I was struck by how timely
many of those statements, written in 1976, are today. I find that
very sad. The ACLU supported the affirmative action program that

the University of California at Davis had adopted in that case, on the
rationale that the program promotes the individual equality neces-

sary to the enjoyment of individual liberty. I would like to read part
of the introduction to that brief:
[T]he major civil liberties issue still facing the United States is the
elimination, root and branch, of all vestiges of racism. No other
asserted claim of right surpasses the wholly justified demand of
the nation's discrete and insular minorities for access to the American mainstream from which they have so long been excluded."
I read the foregoing passage because I know some people in Federalist Society circles see a disparity or tension between the values of
liberty and those of equality. I believe, though, that both sets of
constitutional values are inextricably intertwined for the reason explained in the quoted passage.
Consistent with the foregoing statement in the ACLU's Bakke
brief, Justice Blackmun's powerful dissenting opinion in that case
said that, given the then current state of deprivation of rights and
liberties on the basis of race in our society, affirmative action measures were justified in terms of fundamental social justice.12 Hoping
that racial injustice would mark only a passing phase in our social
history, Justice Blackmun expressed the view that affirmative action
measures should be only temporary.13 He voiced the hope that
these measures would help us to attain a state of equality of oppor14
tunity that is not maldistributed on the basis of race.
Justice Blackmun speculated in Bakke, back in 1976, that a decade might be the limited period during which affirmative action
10 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, The ACLU of Northern California,
The ACLU of Southern California, Amid Curiae, Regents of the Uni. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (No. 76-811) (1978).
11

Id. at2.

Regents of the Uni. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,403 (1978) (BlackmunJustice,
dissenting).
12
13

Id. at 403.
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remedies would be necessary for meaningful progress toward racial
equality. 15 We have long since passed that ten-year mark. The current year, 1991, is 15 years after Bakke was decided and, unfortunately, we have not substantially progressed toward racial equality.
Justice Blackmun would probably acknowledge this fact, and the
ACLU certainly does.
Along with other ACLU leaders, I believe that the most pervasive, overarching civil liberties problem in this country continues to
be racial discrimination. Among all the victims of civil liberties violations that the ACLU represents, regarding a wide range of issues,
people of color are disproportionately included. Therefore, if affirmative action is a remedy that is only going to be necessary on a
temporary basis, we are still in that temporary phase.
In sum, there is a compelling social justice rationale for racebased affirmative action programs. Why should they be seen as
more stigmatizing than other group-based programs? Indeed, we
have many group-based preferences that are not intended to be
compensatory and that do not have the compelling social justice rationale that affirmative action has. When I read the ACLU's brief in
the Bakke case this morning, I was reminded of two such
preferences.
Allen Bakke, the white medical student who sued the University
of California at Davis because he was denied the particular preference that accrued to members of racial minorities, was also denied
two other group-based preferences that were meted out by the medical school, neither of which he challenged. 16 One was a preference
for applicants who intended to practice medicine in northern California following their graduation. 17 The other was a preference for
8
applicants whose spouses were enrolled in the medical school.' It
is telling that Allen Bakke did not challenge those non-racial preferences. Too often, race-based affirmative action is singled out as the
only type of group-based preference in our society that should be
seen as connoting the beneficiary's inferiority, thus making the beneficiary into a victim who bears a stigma.
There is a racist cast to this disparity in societal attitudes toward
different kinds of group-based preferences. Preferences designed to
help traditionally oppressed racial minorities are said to be stigmatizing, but nobody questions whether the many other group-based
preferences prevalent in our society are stigmatizing. Let me read
15
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you a passage which forcefully makes this point. It is from a book by
Philip Green, written in 1981:
Do all those corporate directors, bankers, etc., who got their jobs,
first, because they were somebody's son, second, because they
were male, third, because they were Protestant, and fourth, because they were white feel demeaned thereby? It would be interesting to ask them-and to ask the same question of the doctors
who managed to get into good medical schools because there
were quotas keeping outJews, the skilled tradesmen who were admitted to the union because two members of their family recommended them and so on. Implicit in this critique of affirmative
action, clearly, is a notion that whereas it's never painful to be
rewarded because you are in the majority or the established elite,
it's always painful to be rewarded because you're in the minority
or a marginal group.' 9
Indeed, should those of us who are unintended but actual beneficiaries of years of racial discrimination or gender discrimination in
this society feel stigmatized? Should we feel victimized because we
have, in fact, reaped the benefits of past discrimination?
Another argument that has been raised against affirmative action, which is akin to the notion of stigmatization and victimization,
is the idea that it breeds passivity and leads to a lack of will. Dr.
Keyes made this point. Again, I am not aware of any psychological
studies that support this assertion. Indeed, some of the evidence
Professor Kennedy described seems to call that conclusion into
question.
It also seems a matter of common sense that a group of people
who know they are to be systematically denied certain opportunities
would become discouraged, and such discouragement would breed
a lack of will, a lack of motivation, a lack of incentive. Systematic
discrimination should be expected to breed passivity. A corresponding inference is that the awareness of future opportunity
should be expected to bolster one's resolve and ability to help oneself in meaningful ways.
In conclusion, if affirmative action is fairly understood as a matter of basic social justice, two other, important realizations should
follow: first, that there are no special, undeserving, victimized, stigmatized beneficiaries, but that all of society is a beneficiary; and second, that any stigma should attach to those who unfairly criticize
such a basic tool for pursuing social justice rather than to those who
benefit from the removal of traditional barriers to their full and
meaningful participation in this society.

19

PHILIP GREEN, THE PURSUIT OF INEQUALITY

186 (1981).

